Cash holding, state ownership and firm value: The case of Vietnam by Do, Thi Thanh Nhan
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues | Vol 6 • Special Issue (S6) • 2016110
International Journal of Economics and Financial 
Issues
ISSN: 2146-4138
available at http: www.econjournals.com
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 2016, 6(S6) 110-114.
Special Issue for "IPN Conferences, May 2016"
Cash Holding, State Ownership and Firm Value: The Case of 
Vietnam
Do Thi Thanh Nhan1,2*, Pham Ha3
1Faculty of Management and Economics, Tomas Bata University in Zlín, Czech Republic, 2Finance and Banking Faculty, Ton Duc 
Thang University, Hochiminh City, Vietnam, 3Finance and Banking Faculty, Ton Duc Thang University, Hochiminh City, Vietnam. 
*Email: nhandtt@tdt.edu.vn
ABSTRACT
Using a sample of 650 listed firms on the Vietnamese stock exchange over the period 2008-2015, we examine the effect of cash holding level on firm 
value. The results find out the cash holding has an impact on firm value in an inverted U-shaped form. Furthermore, this study investigates whether 
the state ownership influences firm value. We point out that there is a statistically insignificant positive relationship between state ownership and firm 
value unless the state ownership’s advantages are utilized. The findings have implications of cash management in state-owned firms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cash management has an impact on firm value is explained by 
Tradeoff Model (Myers, 1977), the Pecking Order Theory (Myers 
and Maljuf, 1984), Free Cash Flow Theory (Jensen, 1986), 
three motivations for holding cash by Keynes (1936) and Miller 
and Orr (1966). Managing cash and cash equivalent recently is 
an important decision for the managers because it is using for 
operating all activities in the corporations (Megginson et al., 2014). 
Managing cash has many challenges for all kind of businesses due 
to the fact that the free cash should be invested to earn more profit 
while the firms must ensure the appropriate liquidity to meet the 
demand in future.
There is empirical evidence of increased cash holding in firms 
as follows: 10% of cash holding (Bigelli et al., 2012); 18.5% in 
Japan (Pinkowitz et al., 2001); 17% in United State during 1971-
1994 (Opler et al., 1999). Moreover, the average cash holding 
level in Vietnam is 9.8% which is also high in comparison with 
other current assets. This can cause the conflict increase between 
managers and shareholders when the companies keep more cash 
according to Free Cash Flow Theory (Jensen, 1986). Nevertheless, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) with Pecking off Theory indicates 
that flotation new equities for the firm is very costly because of 
the information asymmetries, thus the firms should hoard more 
cash. The recent studies have examined the relationship between 
cash holding level and firm value. Harford (1999) indicates that 
the corporations hold more cash have greater opportunities to 
compromise than others. Additionally, Martinez-Solano et al. 
(2013) represents that the cash holding has a strong effect on 
firm value by collecting publicly traded US firms belong to SIC 
Code from 3000 to 5999 during the period 2001-2007. Likewise, 
Lee and Powell (2012) showed that the reduction of excess cash 
holding contributes to increasing the firm value and the change of 
excess cash react differently in determining firm value. Moreover, 
Harford et al. (2008) and Derek and Marc (2014) examined that the 
insufficient or excess cash will affect the future stock returns and 
the firm valuation can be explained by the implications of current 
and level of cash holding on the future profitability. Similarly, 
Cheng and Thomas (2006) and Hafzalla et al. (2011) represented 
the buildup of cash flow have influences on the firm value. The 
study about the relationship between cash holding and firm value 
in Vietnam has not attracted the researchers. This paper tests this 
relationship in the context of reform of Vietnamese economy.
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Besides, the main function of this is to decrease the state-owned in 
the corporations in order to increase the management efficiency of 
firms, thereby boosting the firm value. On the one hand the state-
owned has a negative effect on firm value, but on the other hand 
it is a positive impact of state ownership on firm value. Because 
of these reasons above, the paper discusses whether the state 
ownership affects the cash holding and firm value.
The aim of paper confirms whether to have an impact on firm 
value in Vietnamese listed corporations. Importantly, the paper 
also examines the interaction between state ownership, cash 
holding and firm value. The contribution of the paper is that this 
is the first study on the interaction of four main factors, namely 
cash holding, leverage, dividend payment and profitability with the 
state ownership effect on the firm value. All elements are important 
in operating the firms to create more value for the corporations, 
thus the state owned firms should take all opportunities due to the 
connection with the government to improve firm value.
The results find out that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between cash holding and firm value. This argues that there is an 
optimal level of cash holding which can maximize the firm level. 
And the value of companies decreases when the level of cash is 
above or under the optimal level. In addition, the cash holding 
level and firm value also interact with state ownership shows that 
the state-owned corporations can be benefits from support of the 
government to boost the firm value.
The rest of the paper is arranged by reviewing the related literature 
review, defining the model specifications to address the relevant 
empirical studies, analyzing the empirical results and deriving 
implications based on the findings.
2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES
Keynes (1936) states that the demand of holding enough cash is 
decided by the transaction, precautionary and speculative motive. 
Furthermore, Myers and Majluf (1984) with pecking order theory 
indicates that issuing new equities for the firm is very costly 
because of the information asymmetries. Therefore, the enterprises 
finance their investments primarily with internal funds than having 
the difficulty in finding external funds from the debt or issuing 
new shares. Moreover, trade off theory (Myers, 1977) states that 
the optimal cash holding brings more profit due to the fact that 
the firms can take an advantages of investment opportunities for 
the corporations. Equally, cash holding has a strong effect on firm 
value and the firm value reduces when the level of cash exceed 
the optimal level (Martinez-Solano et al., 2013). However, the 
Free Cash Flow Theory (Jensen, 1986) reveals that the conflicts 
increase between managers and shareholders when the companies 
keep more cash. The previous studies support that the reduction of 
excess cash holding contribute to increasing the firm value and the 
change of excess cash react differently in determining firm value 
(Lee and Powell, 2012; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Harford et al., 
2008; Derek and Marc, 2014). The firm value is measured by the 
Tobin’s Q (Martinez-Solano et al., 2013; Dahya et al., 2008). In 
summary, the paper sought to discover the optimal level of cash 
holding needed to maximize firm value by consciously examining 
the relationship between cash holding and firm value.
In addition, some earlier studies point out there has an impact 
of ownership structure on firm value. On one hand, the higher 
proportion of state ownership has more pressure by politicians such 
as lower sales price, more unnecessary employee and not flexible 
in the decision in operating the firms which cause the drawbacks 
of state ownership (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Shleifer, 1998). 
Besides, there are many papers find outs the negative influence 
of state ownership on firm performance (Megginson et al., 1994; 
Capobianco and Christiansen, 2011). On the other hand, Yu 
(2013) shows that positive connection between state ownership 
and firm performance due to assistance from political connections 
and government support. There are many studies from China 
that provide the evidences to confirm the positive relationship 
between state ownership and firm performance (Sun et al., 2002; 
Le and Buck, 2011; Le and Chizema, 2011). Furthermore, the state 
ownership also has an impact on the cash holding level as well 
other factors such as leverage policy, profitability and dividend 
policy and others (Megginson et al., 2014). Consequently, this 
study discovers whether to have an interaction between state 
ownership, cash level and firm value.
3. METHODOLOGY
According to Martinez-Solano et al. (2013), the optimal level of 
cash holding largely depends on cash and its square with other 
control variables to affect firm value. In this model, the Tobin’s Q 
is used as a substitution for firm value. Tobin’s Q is the quotient 
of a firm’s market value to assets cost or total book value which 
is adapted by many authors in corporate finance as a measure of 
firm value (Cooper and Ejarque, 2003; Bai et al., 2004; Bolton 
et al., 2011; Erickson and White, 2012, among others). The control 
variables are leverage, growth and profitability effect the firm value 
(Martinez-Solano et al., 2013; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011). The model 
used is presented in Equation 1 below.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' 2
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it
4 it 5 it it it
Tobin sQ V = + Cash + Cash + Prof
+ Growth + Lev + +  
   
     (1)
Where i is the accumulation of firms; t is time; Vit is the Tobin’s 
Q representing the firm value that is equal market value divided 
by book value; Profit is profitability is net profit plus depreciation 
divided by total assets; Levit is total debt divided by total assets; 
Growthit is natural logarithm of growth of total assets; λit are 
dummy variables and equal for all firms used; εit is the error term; 
β0 to βi are coefficients of the explanatory variables.
The Model 2 adds the state ownership factor in order to find out the 
interaction between the state ownership, cash, dividend payment, 
leverage and firm value. The control variables are leverage, 
dividend and Iven4. The variable Iven4 includes state ownership, 
cash, dividend payment, leverage and profitability. Vo and Van 
(2014) indicates the interaction between managerial ownership, 
leverage and dividend policy in the Vietnamese stock exchange. 
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Additionally, the state ownership has an effect on the cash holding 
level (Megginson et al., 2014) and the profitability impacts on the 
state owned firms (Carlin and Pham, 2008).
Model 1 can rewrite as follow, namely Model 2:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
' 2
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it
4 it 5 it i it it
Tobin sQ V = + Cash + Cash + Div
+ Iven4 + Lev + k +
   
     (2)
Where, i is the accumulation of firms; t is time; ki  is the coefficients 
of the interaction terms of state ownership, cash, dividend 
payment, leverage. Iven4it is equal state ownership with cash, 
dividend, profitability and leverage; Divit is dummy variable which 
equal 1 if the firm pays dividend in a fiscal year and zero otherwise.
The generalized method of moments (GMM) (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and two step GMM 
(Windmeijer, 2005) are used for the models to correct for bias 
caused by endogeneity.
4. DATA
This paper extracted data from financial statements from the 
databases of the two largest stock exchange companies in 
Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange and Hanoi City 
Stock Exchange. In the context of Vietnamese economy has 
volatility and instability from the financial crisis 2008, thus the 
firms intend to hoard more cash to increase the liquidity and 
flexible finance. That is the reason for us to research Vietnam stock 
exchange for the period 2008-2015. We collect the data of 650 
listed firms (excluding financial institutions) on the Vietnamese 
stock exchange.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 represents the summary statistics for all variables used 
in the paper. As can be seen from the Table 1, the average cash 
holding is 9.78% out of total asset which is higher than some 
markets. Likewise, this rate is higher in comparison with others 
such as Teruel and Solano (2008) indicate that the average cash 
holding is 6.57% in Spain; Martinez-Solano et al. (2010) in United 
State, 7.9%; Gill and Shah (2012) in Canada, 3.87%; Lawrencia 
et al. (2012) in Nigeria.
Table 2 presents the result of the effect of cash holding level on firm 
value after managing for unobserved heterogeneity. The Table 2 
shows the relationship exists between cash holding and firm value 
based on using a quadratic equation of cash. Furthermore, the 
Table 1: Descriptive statistic
Variables Obs Mean±SD Minimum Maximum
Tobinq 3973 0.7317262±0.5526319 0.1384 3.7266
Cash 3973 0.0969149±0.1062562 0.0007 0.5053
Cash2 3973 0.0206185±0.0429594 0 0.2489
Lev 3973 1.679028±1.722219 0.002 9.4741
Growth 3973 0.1101038±0.2271135 −0.4239 1.0626
Prof 3973 0.0877111±0.0843527 −0.1432 0.3731
CF 3973 0.1100166±0.1968234 −0.8461 0.9255
Iven4 3973 0.2325861±0.5947303 −2.522939 8.544105
Div 3973 0.7357161±0.4410067 0 1
Tobinq: Market value/book value, Cash: (Cash+cash equivalent)/total asset, Cash2: Cash square, Lev: Total debt/total assets, Growth: Ln (Total assets/Total assets t-1), Prof: (Net 
profit+depreciation)/Total assets, Div: 1 if the firm pays dividend, zero otherwise. Iven4: Cash*state*leverage*dividend*profitability (state is ownership is measured by percentage of 
specific ownership in a firm), CF: Earnings after tax+depreciation/gross sales
Table 2: Cash holding and firm value
Dependent variable: Tobinq Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Cash 28.26407*** (8.313319) 16.06493** (8.089504) 33.88693* (19.24513)
Cash2 −59.5209* (34.65604) −51.90668** (25.15927) −80.49347 (82.75671)
Prof −14.76374** (5.296427) −12.3923 (11.21802)
Growth 2.294532** (1.099821) 2.341389* (1.38559)
Lev −1.126536 (0.9015898) −0.9997174* (0.5681848) −1.622188 (1.606282)
Div −1.18884** (0.4076612)
Iven4 1.065451* (0.5529326)
CF −2.140735 (7.117937)
Hausan 8.42 6.43 7.52
P value 0.209 0.376 0.185
AR (1) (z-score) −3.60 −3.31 −1.55
P value 0.000 0.001 0.122
AR (2) (z-score) −0.93 −1.53 −0.69
P value 0.351 0.127 0.491
N 3335 3335 3335
Tobinq: Market value/book value, Cash: (Cash+cash equivalent)/total asset; Cash2: Cash square, Lev: Total debt/total assets; Growth: Ln (Total assets/Total assets t-1); Prof: (Net 
profit+depreciation)/Total assets; Div 1 if the firm pays dividend, zero otherwise. Iven4: Cash*state*leverage*dividend*profitability (state is ownership is measured by percentage of 
specific ownership in a firm); CF: Earnings after tax+depreciation/gross sales; AR(#): Autocorrelation tests in 1 and 2 order, P value in italics. Standard errors are in parentheses. *P<0.1, 
**P<0.05, ***P<0.01
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regression coefficient of cash variable is positive while Cash2 is 
negative. This suggests an invert U-shaped relationship between 
cash holding and firm value, implies that increasing amount of 
cash leads to the rising of corporate value. However, at the turning 
point the firm value will decrease if the cash holding continues 
growth. The cut-off point equals β
1
/−2*β
2
 which is similar formula 
to Martinez-Solano et al. (2013) in the US. Consequently, the cash 
to total assets ratio which maximizes the firm value is 23.7%. Thus, 
the firm can be maximizing at the optimal cash holding level which 
is consistent with Martinez-Solano et al. (2007).
The Model 2 conducts the estimation the correlation between the 
firm value and state ownership by adding interaction term between 
state, cash, leverage, dividend and profitability. It is consistent with 
previous study (Megginson et al., 2014), the results reflect the state 
ownership has positively effects on firm value. Moreover, the state 
ownership can improve the corporations value due to the strong 
political connection with government’s helps (Yu, 2013). The study 
also discovers that state owned and cash; state with leverage; state 
and dividend policy; state with profitability are not significant 
related. Thus, the value of corporation can increase if it can obtain 
all the support policy from the state. This is consistent because 
Vietnamese government is still considered as a dominant in the 
economy, thus the firms can be supported from the government.
In addition, the robustness testing (Model 3) is applied to check 
the stability of the results. The result point out that there is no 
change of signs in all variables and it exists the optimal level of 
cash holding.
6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The results specifying the cash holding has impact on firm value. 
And there is the optimal level of stockpiling cash which is 23.7% 
cash over total assets. However, the average cash holding level is 
around 9.8%, hence the businesses can increase their firm value 
by raising the level of cash. Correspondingly, the company will 
reduce the value if it keeps the cash above or under the optimal 
level. Therefore, the listed corporations in Vietnam should consider 
this finding as a vital reference to keep suitable the amount of 
cash which improves the firm value. This study further finds the 
state ownership influence firm value. And there is a statistically 
insignificant positive correlation between state ownership and firm 
value unless the state shareholders obtain all their advantages. 
This shows some suggestions for the policy on reducing the state 
ownership in Vietnamese firms. Maximizing firm value can be 
reached by the efficient state capital management.
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